Object-oriented languages provide little support for encapsulating objects. Reference semantics allows objects to escape their defining scope, and the pervasive aliasing that ensues remains a major source of software defects. This paper presents Kacheck/J, a tool for inferring object encapsulation properties of large Java programs. Our goal is to develop practical tools to assist software engineers, thus we focus on simple and scalable techniques. Kacheck/J is able to infer confinement-the property that all instances of a given type are encapsulated in their defining package. This simple property can be used to identify accidental leaks of sensitive objects, as well as for compiler optimizations. We report on the analysis of a large body of code and discuss language support and refactoring for confinement.
INTRODUCTION
Object-oriented languages rely on reference semantics to allow sharing of objects. Sharing occurs when an object is accessible to different clients, while aliasing occurs when an object is accessible from the same client through different access paths. Sharing and aliasing are both powerful tools and sources of subtle program defects. A potential consequence of aliasing is that methods invoked on an object may depend on each other in a manner not anticipated by designers of those objects, and updates in one subsystem can affect apparently unrelated subsystems, thus undermining the reliability of the program.
While object-oriented languages provide linguistic support for protecting access to fields, methods, and entire classes, they fail to provide any systematic way of protecting objects. A class may well declare some field private and yet expose the contents of that field by returning it from a public method. In other words, object-oriented languages protect the state of individual objects, but cannot guarantee the integrity of systems of interacting objects. They lack a notion of an encapsulation boundary that would ensure that references to "protected" objects do not escape their scope.
The goal of this paper is to report on experiments with a pragmatic notion of encapsulation in order to provide software engineers with tools to guide them in the design of robust systems. To this end, we focus on simple models of encapsulation that can easily be understood. We deliberately ignore more powerful escape analyses [Blanchet 1999 [Blanchet , 2003 Bogda and Hölzle 1999; Deutsch 1995] which are sensitive to small code changes and may be difficult to interpret, as well as more powerful notions of ownership [Aldrich et al. 2002; Banerjee and Naumann 2002; Barnett et al. 2004; Boyapati et al. 2002 Boyapati et al. , 2003 Boyland 2001; Clarke 2001; Clarke and Wrigstad 2003; Detlefs et al. 1996; Rustan et al. 2004; Müller and Poetzsch-Heffter 1999] . Of course, the tradeoff is that we will sometime deem an object as 'escaping' when a more precise analysis would discover that this is not the case. In particular, we have chosen to investigate confined types introduced by Bokowski and Vitek [2001] as they give rise to a form of encapsulation that is both simple to understand and that can be checked with little cost. The basic idea underlying confined types is the following:
Objects of a confined type are encapsulated in their defining, sealed package.
Thus, if a class is confined, instances of that class and all of its subclasses cannot be manipulated by code belonging to other packages. An instance of a confined type cannot flow to an object outside the package of the confined type. In terms of aliasing, confinement allows aliases within a package but prevents them from spreading to other packages as illustrated in Figure 1 .
The original definition of confinement required explicit annotations and thus presupposes that software is designed with confinement in mind. In some sense, the underlying assumption was that confinement is an unusual property that may require substantial changes to the original program. In this work, we take a different point of view. We claim that confinement is a natural property of Fig. 1 . Confinement is a property of object references. The diagram illustrates confinement in a tiny program with two packages called inside and outside and three classes inside.Confined, inside.Unconfined and outside.Other. Arrows denote allowed reference patterns. If the class Confined obeys the confinement rules, then objects defined in package outside cannot hold references to instances of the class Confined, the class is said to be encapsulated in the inside package.
well designed software systems. We validate our hypothesis empirically with a tool that infers confinement in Java programs. We gathered a suite of forty-six thousand Java classes and analyzed them for confinement. Our results show that, without any change to the source, 24% of the package-scoped classes (exactly 3,804 classes or 8% of all classes) are confined. Furthermore, we found that by using generic container types, the number of confined types could be increased by close to one thousand additional classes. Finally, with appropriate tool support to tighten access modifiers, the number of confined classes can be well over 14,500 (or over 29% of all classes) for that same benchmark suite. While a more powerful program analysis may yield higher numbers of confined classes, especially if a whole-program approach is taken, our current numbers are already high and can be obtained efficiently as the average time to analyze a class file is less than eight milliseconds.
In a related effort, Zhao et al. [2006] have shown that the confinement rules are sound for a simple object calculus inspired by Featherweight Java [Igarashi et al. 2001 ] in which sharing is impossible. This was achieved by recasting the confinement rules into a type system. They also showed the soundness of an extension of the confinement rules to generic types; we will discuss that extension later in this article.
Since their introduction confined types have been applied in several different contexts. have shown that minor changes to the confinement rules presented here can be used to check the architectural integrity constraints that must be satisfied by Enterprise Java Beans applications. Zhao et al. [2004] have applied the same ideas to Real-time Specification for Java to ensure static safety of scoped memory usage, Herrmann et al. [2003] introduced confinement as a software engineering mechanism for a new programming language. Skalka and Smith [2005] have studied a somewhat different notion of confinement within the context of programming language security. In their work, the main goal is to control not the flow of references to objects but rather which methods are invoked on those objects.
This article makes the following contributions and improvements on previous work on confinement:
-We simplify and generalize the confinement rules presented in the original paper on confined types [Bokowski and Vitek 1999] . -We present an efficient constraint-based confinement inference algorithm.
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-We give an overview of the implementation of Kacheck/J, our confinement inference tool. -We give results of the confinement analysis of a large corpus of programs.
-We discuss refactorings aimed at improving confinement as well as better language support.
Paper Overview
This article is organized as follows: Section 2 starts with a look at an example of confinement in practice with a class taken from the Java standard library. Section 3 introduces confined types and the associated confinement rules. Section 4 presents our constraint-based analysis algorithm. Section 5 discusses the implementation of the inference tool. Section 6 gives result of the analysis of the benchmark suite. Section 7 discusses refactoring and language support. In Section 8 we present an example from the Freenet benchmark [Clarke et al. 2000 [Clarke et al. , 2002 , where Kacheck/J is used to first discover that a class is not confined. The code is then refactored such that the class becomes confined. Section 9 gives an overview of related work. Section 10 concludes. The complete constraint generation rules are given in Appendix A. Appendix B gives additional benchmark data.
A PRACTICAL EXAMPLE OF CONFINEMENT
In statically typed object-oriented programming languages such as Java, confinement can be achieved by a disciplined use of built-in access control mechanisms and some simple coding idioms. We will give a simple motivating example and use it to illustrate our analysis. Consider the class HashtableEntry used within the implementation of Hashtable in the java.util package. The access modifier for this class is set to default access, which, in Java, means that the class is scoped by its defining package. HashtableEntry instances are used to implement linked lists of elements which have the same hash code modulo table size. They are a prime example of an internal data structure which is only relevant to one particular implementation of a hashtable and that should not escape the context of that table and definitely not of its defining package. Yet how can we be sure that code outside of the package cannot get access to an entry object? Since HashtableEntry is a package-scoped class we need not worry that outside code will create instances of the class. However, the implementation of the hash table class itself could cast an entry object to some public superclass, and then expose a reference to the object. Alternatively, in the case where a public method were to return an entry object or a public field held a reference to such an object, outside code might obtain a reference to it (possibly causing an unexpected memory leak, say in a weak hash map). The outside code could also use that reference as an argument (which might have security implications if the object was representing ownership of a permission), or cast it to some public parent class and invoke methods on it (which may be problematic, in particular if the methods are overridden in the subclass and were not intended to be reachable from outside of the package).
• 32:5 Fig. 2 . Analysis overview. All classes in the enclosing package, java.util in this case, are checked for confinement. Parent classes of confined classes (e.g., Object) are checked for anonymity. Client code need not be checked.
It is likely that a programmer would consider these scenarios to be the result of a programming error, and a good programmer would take care to prevent such confinement breaches. One can view this issue as an escape problem: can references to instances of a package-scoped class escape their enclosing package? If not, then the objects of such a class are said to be encapsulated in the package. In the example at hand, HashtableEntry is indeed encapsulated as programmers have carefully avoided exposing them to code outside of the java.util package.
Confinement can be checked by a simple program analysis which relies on access modifiers of classes, fields and methods and performs a context and flow insensitive analysis of the code of the confining package. We have implemented a tool called Kacheck/J that discovers potential confinement violations and returns a list of confined types for each package analyzed. For instance, in the above example, the expected result of the analysis would be that HashtableEntry is confined to the package java.util, while Hashtable is not since it has been declared public. In order to determine this, the tool must analyze the body of all classes declared in the package java.util package, as well as all parent classes of confined classes. Figure 2 illustrates the checks performed by the tool. The analysis is modular since only one package (and the parent classes of confined types) needs to be considered at a time; this turns out to be a key feature for scalability. Furthermore, since client code is not required when checking confinement, it is possible to use our tool on library code.
It turns out that, contrary to our expectation, our analysis infers that the class HashtableEntry is not confined because the method clone() is invoked on one of its instances. The problem is that clone returns a copy of an entry which is typed as Object. Manual inspection of the code reveals that each invocation of this methods is immediately followed by a cast to HashtableEntry. Thus, instances of the class do not actually escape; this is a typical pattern in a language without adequate support for genericity. Our analysis is not precise enough to discover the idiom-this is part of the price we pay for simplicity. One could consider extending the analysis to catch such idioms and we leave that for future work.
CONFINED TYPES
The goal of confinement is to satisfy the following soundness property: An object of confined type is encapsulated in the scope of that type. Notice that scope is a static notion whereas confinement controls run-time flow of objects. The idea of confined types is to make the static scope define a bound on where an object can flow. In this work, we have set the granularity of confinement to be the package (other granularities have been studied in and Zhao et al. [2004] ; only minimal changes to the rules are required). Thus, no instance of a confined type may escape the package in which that type is defined. In order to ensure that the analysis is modular and sound in the presence of dynamic loading, we must ensure that new code does not show up inside of the encapsulation boundary after the analysis. In Java, this can easily be achieved by requiring that the encapsulating package is sealed [Sun Microsystems 2000; Zaks et al. 2000] . Henceforth, when we say that instances of a confined class are encapsulated in their defining package we require that the package is sealed.
Confinement is enforced by two sets of constraints. The first set of constraints, confinement rules, apply to the enclosing package, the package in which the confined class is defined. These rules track values of confined types and ensure that they are neither exposed in public members, nor widened to nonconfined types. We use the term, widening, to denote both: -static widening from C to B. An expression or a statement that requires a check that C is a subtype of B, and -hidden widening to B. An expression or a statement that requires that the type of the distinguished variable this is a subtype of B.
A typical example of static widening is an assignment x=y, where x is of type B and y is of type C; Java requires that C is a subtype of B. A typical example of hidden widening is an assignment x=this, where x is of type B; the dynamic type of the this-object cannot be determined locally, so we say that the assignment results in a hidden widening from that dynamic type of this to B. The second set of constraints, so-called anonymity rules, applies to methods inherited by the confined classes, potentially including library code, and ensures that these methods do not leak a reference to this which may refer to an object of confined type.
In this section, we adapt the rules of Bokowski and Vitek [1999] to infer confinement. The new rules are both simpler and less restrictive (i.e., more classes can be shown confined), while remaining sound. As in the original paper, the rules presented here do not require a closed-world assumption. Confinement inference is performed at the package level. The rules assume that all classes in a package are known and, for confined classes, that their superclasses are available.
Enforcing confinement relies on tracking the spread of encapsulated objects within a package and preventing them from crossing package boundaries. We have chosen to track encapsulated objects via their type. Thus, a confinement breach will occur as soon as a value of a confined type can escape its package. Since we track types, widening a value from a confined type to a non-confined type is a violation of the confinement property.
Anonymity Rules
Anonymity rules apply to inherited methods that may (but do not have to) reside in classes outside of the enclosing package. The goal of this set of rules is to prevent a method from leaking a reference aliasing the distinguished this pointer. The motivation for these rules is that if this refers to an encapsulated object, returning or storing it amounts to hidden widening.
We say that a method is anonymous if it satisfies the three rules in Figure 3 . The first rule prevents an inherited method from storing or returning this unless the static type of this also happens to be confined. The second rule ensures that native methods are never anonymous. While rules A1 and A2 are direct anonymity violations, the rule A3 tracks transitive violations. The call mentioned in rule A3 depends on the dynamic type of this (the target of the call). Thus, anonymity of a method is determined in relation to a specific type. One can use a conservative flow analysis to determine a set of possible target methods, or one can rely on the static type to determine possible targets. Figure 4 gives an example of a problematic piece of code where a nonanonymous method allows presumably encapsulated objects to escape their container, possibly leaking private information. The interesting thing to note here is that for all assignments in the code the static types match exactly. In particular, the widening of the type of the presumably encapsulated object happens in the escape method when the static type of this is C. Detecting such hidden widenings is the purpose of the anonymity rules. Explicit (static) widenings, that is assignments where the static types of the variables involved are different, are covered by rules described in the next section.
An alternative approach would be to simplify the rules (as taken in ]) and to disallow confined types to extend types other than Object. Anonymity rules are then no longer needed: the only place where hidden widening can occur with that limitation is Object. The only violation in Object is clone(), which is then handled with a specific rule. However, while this approach significantly simplifies the rules for confinement, it also severely Fig. 4 . Example of hidden widening in a non-anonymous method resulting in a confinement breach. A client outside of the package could execute container.exposeAccidentally(). getSecret(); to obtain the secret, despite the fact that Internal is package-scoped and there is no static widening of Internal to C. restricts the set of classes that can be confined. In this article, we focus on the design with anonymous methods.
Confinement Rules
Confinement rules are applied to all classes of a package. A class is confined if it satisfies the five rules of Figure 5 . Rule C1 ensures that no inherited method invoked on a confined type will leak the this pointer. Together with the anonymity rules this rule prevents hidden widening. Note that the rule does not preclude a confined type from inheriting (or even declaring) non-anonymous methods, as long as they are never called. Rule C2 prevents public classes from being confined. This is necessary since code outside of the package must not be able to instantiate a confined type. Rule C3 ensures that no exposed member (public or protected) is of a confined type. This applies to all nonconfined types in the package. Rule C4 prevents nonconfined classes (or interfaces) from extending confined types. This rule is primarily a design choice from the point of view that if a confined type encapsulates internal information, that information should also not be leaked as part of a subtype. In [Zhao et al. 2006] it was shown that leaking references to confined types from a package can be prevented without this rule. Finally, rule C5 prevents static widening of references of confined type to nonconfined types.
Discussion and Special Cases
Exceptions are a case of widening that is not explicitly listed in our rules. Instead, we consider that throw widens its argument to the class Throwable, which is declared public and thus violates rule C5.
Our confinement rules do not forbid packages from having native code, but rule A2 explicitly states that native methods are not anonymous. The motivation for this design choice is that while the developer of a package may be expected to manually inspect native code in the current package, it would be difficult to check native code of parent classes belonging to standard libraries. Furthermore, uses of this that violate A1 are usually not perceived as bad behavior for native code. Essentially, we assume that native code within the enclosing package is, to some extent, trusted. In other words, with respect to anonymity, we make the safe choice that a native method cannot be anonymous; it can do whatever it wants. With respect to confinement, we trust the native methods to not violate the confinement rules. The reason for this design decision is that native code that does not conflict with the Java type system may still violate the anonymity rules. However, confinement violations can happen anywhere in native code, thus if we do not want to analyze or rule out all native code, we must trust that native code does not violate confinement. We have manually inspected some of the native code in GNU Classpath, and we found that anonymity violations do happen. We did not find any confinement violations in the native code that we inspected.
In Java, System.arraycopy is often used to copy elements from one array to another. While the signature of this special native method takes arguments of type Object and thus calls to this method would constitute a widening to a nonconfined type, this method is used frequently enough to warrant a special treatment in Kacheck/J. The tool treats calls to System.arraycopy as a widening from the inferred source-array type to the inferred destination array type. This is safe if the language implements System.arraycopy correctly.
Another optimization in Kacheck/J is the treatment of static widenings of this. Static widenings of this are covered by both rules for anonymity (A1) and for confinement (C5). But while rule A1 will only have an impact on confinement if the anonymous method is actually invoked (C1), rule C5 would always make the statically widened type nonconfined. While this makes no difference in many cases, this does have an impact on some types if the code in which the widening takes place is dead. In some sense, A1 implicitly contains a limited flow-sensitive dead code analysis, while C5 does not. The Kacheck/J tool can be made to relax the rule C5 to not include static widenings of this (since those would be caught by rule A1 if the code is not dead). An example for this is shown in Figure 6 . If the optimization is enabled, the liveness of the dead() method determines whether Conf is confined. This illustrates how relaxing C5 makes the analysis more fragile in the sense that small changes in the code are more likely to change the set of confined classes.
In a related effort, Zhao et al. [2006] have shown that the confinement rules are sound for a simple object calculus inspired by Featherweight Java [Igarashi et al. 2001 ] in which sharing is impossible. In that article, the three anonymity rules are consolidated into just one rule, namely "the this reference is only used to select fields and as receiver in invocation of other anonymous methods." That can be done because the calculus does not have native methods or assignment statements. Potanin et al. [2004] have presented an alternative means to check package confinement, by reduction to Java generics have shown that minor changes to the confinement rules presented here can be used to check the architectural integrity constraints that must be satisfied by Enterprise Java Beans applications. One main difference between their rules and ours is that they don't use a notion of anonymous methods. To a first approximation, we can understand their rules as the result removing A1-A3 from our rules and changing C1 to "All methods invoked on a confined type must be defined in a confined type." make a few further restrictions on the confinement rules that are appropriate for the domain of Enterprise Java Beans. In contrast to our analysis, their analysis enables different classes to appear as confined and as unconfined in different parts of the application (i.e., in different beans). The overall result is an analysis that works at a different level of granularity than ours and offers confinement per bean, rather than per package. The experimental results of demonstrate that their analysis works well in the domain of Java Beans.
CONSTRAINT-BASED ANALYSIS
We use a constraint-based program analysis to infer method anonymity and confinement. Constraint-based analyses have previously been used for a wide variety of purposes, including type inference and flow analysis. Constraintbased analysis proceeds, as usual, in two steps: (1) Generate a system of constraints from program text. (2) Solve the constraint system. The solution to the constraint system is the desired information. In our case, constraints are of the following forms:
A constraint not-anon(methodId) asserts that the method methodId is not anonymous; similarly, not-conf(classId) asserts that the class classId is not confined. The remaining four forms of constraints denote logical implications. For example, not-anon(A.m()) ⇒ not-conf(C) is read "if method m in class A is not anonymous then class C will not be confined."
We generate constraints from the program text in a straightforward manner. The example of Figure 7 illustrates the generation of constraints. For each syntactic construct, we have indicated in comments the associated rule from Section 3. Figure 8 details the constraints that are generated for that example. A complete description of the constraints generated from Java bytecode is given in Appendix A. All our constraints are ground Horn clauses. Our solution procedure computes the set of clauses not-conf(classId) that are either immediate facts or derivable via logical implication. This computation can be done in linear time [Dowling and Gallier 1984] in the number of constraints, which, in turn, is linear in the size of the program.
Control Flow Analysis
The rule C1 poses a control flow problem as it mandates that only methods that are actually invoked on a confined type need to be anonymous. Any conservative control flow analysis can be used to yield a set of candidate methods. We have chosen to perform a simple flow insensitive analysis that is practical and precise enough for our purposes.
Methods of confined classes cannot be invoked from outside of their defining package since confined types are by definition not public (C2) and cannot be widened to non-confined types (C5). So, for anonymity violations that are relevant to a given type, the analysis only needs to consider invocations of methods on instances of that type and its subtypes. Subtypes must be included since confined types may be widened to other confined types.
Our analysis performs a fixed-point iteration starting with the assumption that all non-public classes could potentially be confined. The analysis then records invocations of the type x.m(), where the type of x is in the current candidate set for confinement. These invocations form the root set for the control flow analysis. Calls of the form this.m() that are reachable from this root set are recorded in accordance with anonymity rule A3. The set of types of this that are used for resolving virtual method calls is the static type of x, as inferred during bytecode verification, and all subtypes of that type that are ever found to be widened to it. Naturally, such widenings (rules A1 and C5) may be detected at any time during the flow analysis, which is the reason why a fixedpoint computation is necessary. When the fixed-point computation terminates and all invocation chains for all applicable confinement candidates have been traversed, the remaining types for which no anonymity violations were found are declared confined.
The analysis does not attempt to perform dead-code detection, so while the method that includes an invocation such as x.m() may be dead, we will nevertheless add m to the root set. This simplifies the analysis but costs some precision. Doing dead code detection would lead to analysis results that are much more sensitive to changes in the source program.
IMPLEMENTING CONFINEMENT INFERENCE: KACHECK/J
Although the confinement and anonymity rules have been described as source level constraints, we have chosen to implement Kacheck/J as a bytecode analyzer. The main advantage of working at the bytecode level is that there are a large number of class files freely available to apply our tool to. The implementation of Kacheck/J leverages the XTC static analysis framework that was developed as part of the Ovm JVM. In XTC, bytecode verification is implemented using the Flyweight pattern [Gamma et al. 1994] . For each of the 200 bytecode instructions defined in the Java Virtual Machine Specification, the XTC verifier creates an Instruction object that is responsible for computing the effect this instruction will have on an abstract state. Verification is a simple fixed-point iteration. The verification starts with an initial state that includes the instruction pointer, operand stack and variables. The verifier follows all possible flows of control within the method.
By instrumenting the transfer functions of only 9 of the 200 Instruction objects we can use XTC's abstract interpretation engine to generate constraints. The instrumentation performs some simple checks and record basic facts about the program execution. For instance, the code for the areturn instruction checks if this is used as return value, and if so, it reports that this is widened to the return type of the method. The invoke instructions record dependencies like the use of this as an argument or when a method is invoked on this. Overall, the following changes were applied to the verifier: -In non-static methods, local variable 0 (this) is tracked and uses of this are recorded. -All static widenings are recorded; thrown exceptions are considered widened to Throwable.
Widenings are captured by intercepting subtype checks done by the verifier. Anonymity checks only require slight modifications to the transfer functions that correspond to the nine instructions: a check is added to record operations on this. See Appendix A for details. The flow analysis computes the implication chains for each potentially confined type T , such that
The code specific to confined types (including verbose reporting of violations) is about 2,200 lines. The code reused from XTC (including reading and writing of Java 5.0 class files) is about 30,000 lines of code. Figure 9 gives an example of a chain of constraints that results in classes being not confined. Although the tool reorders parts of the solving process, we will in the following explain only the final chain of constraints. Notice first that Object is a nonconfined class, so a constraint of the type C is generated by rule C2:
Example
The method P.nonAnon() widens this to Object. This will generate a constraint of type C ⇒ A by rule A1: The invocation of nonAnon in nonAnonInd with this as the receiver generates a constraint of the type A ⇒ A by rule A3:
The method nonAnonInd() is invoked on C. By rule C1 a constraint of the type A ⇒ C is generated:
As C extends B, a constraint of the type C ⇒ C is generated by rule C4:
Solving this constraint system will result in B and C being non-confined (and P and X cannot be confined either because they are public).
Simplifying Assumptions
Kacheck/J operates under some simplifying assumptions, which we detail here.
Reflection. The analysis assumes that reflection is not used to circumvent language access control. In other words, it assumes that the semantics of private, protected and default access modifiers are respected by the reflection mechanisms. This assumption can be violated by changing the settings of the Java Security Manager. This may result in additional confinement breaches.
Native Code. Native methods are not checked by Kacheck/J and may breach confinement. The results obtained from Kacheck/J are only valid if native methods do not violate any of the confinement rules. Furthermore, we assume that native code in does not violate the semantics of the language by ignoring access control declarations. Manual inspection of a number of native methods indicates that these assumptions are reasonable. We do not assume that native methods satisfy the anonymity rules. Note though that we manually inspected the native methods and did not find any that violate the rules for anonymous methods.
ANALYSIS RESULTS
Kacheck/J has been evaluated on a large data set. This section gives an overview of the benchmark programs and presents the results of the analysis. The first goal of the evaluation is to show that confinement is a common property in actual code (Section 6.2). The second goal is to identify common reasons why certain types are not confined and thereby gauge the limitations of our technique (Section 6.3). Studying reasons for nonconfinement also points out possible places where slight modifications to the analysis would dramatically increase opportunities for confinement. We present three such modifications in Sections 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. In order to give evidence that confinement is a stable property that a programmer might want to declare in the program text, Section 6.7 studies how confinement properties of types change during the lifetime of a particular application. Annotating types as confined would not be practical if confinement was a fragile property and annotations would need to be changed frequently. Finally, in order for confinement to be useful in practice, we will demonstrate that checking or inferring confinement scales and can be done quickly. Section 6.8 shows that Kacheck/J can rapidly analyze huge benchmarks.
The Purdue Benchmark Suite
The Purdue Benchmark Suite (Figure 10 ) consists of 33 Java programs and libraries of varying size, purpose and origin. The entire suite contains 46,165 classes (or 115 MB of bytecode) and 1,771 packages. To the best of our knowledge, the PBS is the largest such collection of Java programs. Most of the benchmarks are freely available and can be obtained from the Kacheck/J web page. Figure 11 gives an overview of the sizes, in number of classes, for each program or library that is part of the PBS. Appendix B provides additional data about the benchmarks. Our largest benchmarks, over 2,000 classes each, are Forte, JDK 1.2.2, JDK 1.3.*, Ozone, Voyager and JTOpen. Ozone and Forte are applications, while the others are libraries. The number of package-scoped classes is indicated in light gray for each application. This number is an upper bound for the number of confined classes; public classes cannot be confined. Figure 12 relates the proportion of package-scoped members to packagescoped classes. Package-scoped members are fields and methods that are declared to have either private or default access. Most coding disciplines encourage the use of package-scoped methods and package-scoped classes. Not surprisingly, programs that were designed with reuse in mind, such as libraries and frameworks, are better-written than one-shot applications. For instance, the Aglet workbench and JTOpen, both libraries, exhibit high degrees of encapsulation. Forte is noteworthy because even though it is an application, it has over 50% package-scoped classes and members. Compilers and optimizers written in an object-oriented style, such as Bloat, Toba and Soot, have high numbers of package-scoped classes because of the many classes used to represent syntactic elements or individual bytecode instructions. At the other extreme, we have applications like Jax and Kawa which have almost no package-scoped classes. It is also worth noting the increase in encapsulation between different versions of the JDK. From JDK1.1.8 to JDK1.3.1, the absolute number of classes tripled, and yet the percentage of package-scoped classes doubled. The reason is largely that most of the JDK1.1.8 code implements the simple, public core classes of the Java runtime (java.*), whereas JDK1.3.1 has substantial amounts of code that the main application does not interface with directly.
Coding style has an impact on confinement. While the relation between package-scoped classes and confined types is obvious, there is a more subtle connection between package-scoped members and confined types: public and protected methods can return potentially confined types. So it is reasonable to expect that programs with low proportions of package-scoped members will also have comparatively fewer confined types.
Confined Types
Running Kacheck/J over the PBS yields 3,804 confined classes; 24% of the package-scoped classes and 8% of all classes are confined. Figure 13 shows confined classes in percentage of all classes. The numbers are broken down per program with confined inner classes in light gray. Raw numbers are given in Appendix B.
There are six programs where more than 40% of the package-scoped types are confined (db, gf, jy, jb, jp, o4) . It is interesting to note that these programs have very little in common: they are a mix of libraries (gf), frameworks (o4) and applications (db, jy, jb, jp) . Their ratio of package-scoped classes and their sizes vary widely. Indeed, manual inspection of the programs indicates that programming style is essential to confinement. For example, in early versions of Ovm and Kacheck/J, unit tests were systematically stored in a subpackage of the current package. Some methods and classes were declared public only to allow testing of the code. This in turn prevented many classes from being confined. The large number of confined inner classes in Ovm (o4) comes from the objects representing bytecode instructions nested in an instruction set class. For Jalapeno, the high confinement ratio of 16% (155 classes out of 994) is partially the result of the single package structure of the program.
Predictably, programs with very few package-scoped classes (e.g., ja, kw, sh, gf) end up with few confined classes. Figure 14 shows the relationship between package-scoped classes and confined classes. Notice that the fraction 
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• 32:19 of package-scoped classes varies considerably from benchmark to benchmark. For instance, libraries like Aglets (ag) which have very high ratios of packagescoped members and classes still perform quite poorly with only 13 classes (3%) being confined out of 410. Why does this happen? To answer that question, we start with a discussion of confinement violations.
Confinement Violations
It is difficult to quantify confinement violations into categories based on the constraints, mostly because many of the constraints work in concert. For example, widening one class to another (C5) may violate confinement because the other class is not confined because, in turn, a non-anonymous method (A1) is invoked (C1) on it. And the reason for why the method is not anonymous could be because a third class is public (C2). Notice that the confinement violation for the original class involves four different constraints. Rather than trying to quantify confinement violations, this section attempts to describe the causes for nonconfinement based on a few characteristic examples.
Most confinement breaches are caused by a small number of widely used programming idioms. For any violation, Kacheck/J returns a textual representation of the implication chain that caused the violation. We give examples of the main causes for classes not being confined. The PermissionEditor class is an abstract superclass of the non-public SecurityPermissionEditor. PermissionEditor is the part of the interface that is exported outside the package.
Widening in Containers.
A large number of violations comes from the use of container classes in Java. Data structures such as vectors and hashtables always take arguments of type Object, thus any use of a container will entail widening to the most generic super type. For instance, Kacheck/J reports that NativeLibrary, an inner class of ClassLoader, is not confined. java/lang/ClassLoader\$NativeLibrary:
Illegal Widening to java/lang/Object Kacheck/J works with bytecodes, not source code. At the bytecode level of Java, generic types are absent. One might implement a Kacheck/J-like tool at the source level that handles generic types in a nontrivial way. We leave that for future work; inspiration might come from the paper by Zhao et al. [2006] which presented rules for handling confinement of generic types.
The error occurs because an instance of NativeLibrary is stored in a vector:
systemNativeLibraries.addElement(lib);
As such, this violation may indicate a security problem. The internals of class loaders should really be encapsulated. Inspection of the code reveals that the Vector in which the object is stored is private private static Vector systemNativeLibraries = new Vector();
After a little more checking, it is obvious that the vector does not escape from its defining class. But this requires inspection of the source code and only remains true only until the next patch is applied to the class. This example shows the usefulness of tools such as Kacheck/J as they can direct the attention of software engineers towards potential security breaches or software defects.
Anonymous Inner Classes.
This violation occurs frequently when inner classes are used to implement call-backs. For example, in Aglets, the MouseListener class is public. Thus, the following code violates confinement of the anonymous inner class mlistener = new MouseAdapter() { public void mouseEntered(MouseEvent e) { ... } };
Similar situations occur with package-scoped classes that implement public interfaces. They are package-scoped to protect their members, but are exported outside of the package. 6.3.5 Summary. Even though confinement violations are often the result of a chain of events, there are two rules that, by themselves, eliminate most opportunities for confinement and thus deserve further consideration. The confinement rules that are the cause for the largest number of nonconfined types overall are C2 (class is public), followed by C5 (instance widened to nonconfined type). How dramatic the effect of these rules is shown in the following sections, where small modifications are made which limit the scope of these rules, resulting in a significant increase in the number of confined types. In Section 6.4, widening of confined types is discounted whenever it happens in conjunction with containes (eliminating many common applications of rule C5). In Section 6.5, the access modifiers are inferred, making many classes and methods package-scoped that used to be public. Both variations result in a sharp increase in the number of confined types. 
Confinement with Generics
In Java, vectors, hashtables and other containers are pervasive. Every time an object is stored in a container, its type is widened to Object leading to a widening violation for the object's class. If Java supported proper parametric polymorphism, the large majority of the violations would disappear (there can be a few heterogeneous data structures, but they seem be the exception).
In order to try to assess the impact of generics, without rewriting all of the programs in the PBS, we modified Kacheck/J to ignore widening violations linked to containers. This is done by ignoring all widenings to Object that occur in calls to methods of classes java.util. Figure 15 gives the percentages of confined classes without generic violations; we call these classes GenericConfined (GC). The light gray bars show the original number of confined classes. The dark grey bars show the effect of adding genericity. The number of confined types increases from 3804 (8%) to 4862 (10%) over all programs in the PBS. These results should be viewed with caution because they could represent an overestimate of the potential gains since we do not guarantee that the container instances are package-scoped.
Inferring Access Modifiers
The low number of confined classes in some of the benchmarks is surprising. Looking at the access modifiers of classes in these benchmarks, the reason is immediately clear. For example, in Kawa, out of 443 classes, only 5 (1%) are package-scoped. Similarly, many benchmarks contain methods and/or fields that are declared as public and thus prevent certain types from being confined. That raises the question of whether the access modes are the tightest possible or whether they are more permissive than necessary. To answer the question we infer the tightest access modes during analysis and then use the inferred modes for confinement checking. This analysis is performed by the Java Access Modifier Inference Tool (JAMIT), which is also available on our webpage. JAMIT infers the tightest legal access modes by looking at all accesses to a given member or type. It then checks what the most restrictive access modifier is that would permit all accesses according to Java's visibility rules. The analysis takes subtyping into account; subtypes can view protected members and overriding methods can only relax access modifiers. More importantly, in order to preserve overriding the access modifier in the parent may need to be relaxed to package-scoped (if all overriding subtypes reside in the same package) or protected. Figure 16 shows the result of running Kacheck/J on code for which access modifiers were strengthened using JAMIT. Classes that become confined with modifier inference are called Confinable (CA). With mode inference, the number of confinable classes jumps from 3804 (8%) to 12,880 (26.1%) for the entire PBS. Furthermore if we combine confinable and generics, we obtain 14,591 (29.6%) Generic-Confinable classes. Figure 17 relates the results of this new analysis to the original number of package-scoped classes. It is quite telling to see that Jax and Kawa, which were applications with the lowest numbers of confined classes suddenly have about 40% of their classes confinable. Of course, using this option on library code may yield an overestimate of the potential gains as some classes that are never used from within the library can be made package-scoped, even though client code requires access to these classes. Nevertheless, the results give a good indication of the potential gains.
Hierarchical Packages
Our last experiment involves changing the semantics of the Java package mechanism. Currently, Java has a flat package namespace; that is to say, even though package names can be nested, there is no semantics in this nesting. This creates a dilemma between data abstraction and modularity. Good design practice suggests that applications be split into packages according to functional characteristics of the code. On the other hand, creating packages forces certain classes to become public even if those classes should not be used by clients of the program. From a confinement perspective, we could say more packages result in fewer confined classes. One extreme is Jalapeno, which is structured as a single package. This diminishes the usefulness of the confinement property.
To evaluate the impact of the package structure on confinement, we modified Kacheck/J to use a hierarchical package model. The general idea is that package-access would be extended to neighbor packages. We introduce a definition of scope that we call n-package-scoped. n-package-scoped limits access to classes in packages that are less than n nodes in the tree of package names away from the defining package. For example, the class java.util.HashtableEntry would be visible for java.lang.System for n = 2. The unnamed package is defined to have distance ∞ from all other packages, making a n-package-scoped class a.A invisible for b.B regardless of the choice of n. Figure 18 shows the cumulative improvements yielded by increasing the proximity threshold n. With n = 9 most programs are treated as a single package, increasing the number of confined types from 3,804 to 7,495. The largest increase in confined classes comes from the Voyager benchmark where the number of confined classes increases from 208 to 1021.
Evolution of Confinement
For the working software engineer, it may be of interest to know whether confinement is preserved when software evolves. If a class is confined in one software version, then it would be helpful to know whether the class will likely be confined also in the next version. If the answer is yes, then confinement can be viewed as a meaningful, fundamental property of a type, and not just a coincidence of the arrangement of the code. To shed light on this issue, we present a study of the confined types in 14 versions of TomCat, ranging from version 3.0 to an early snapshot of 5.0. The results are unambiguous. Even with dramatic changes to the code base that involve adding and removing hundreds or thousands of classes, only very few existing classes suddenly become confined or stop being confined. Almost all confined classes stay confined (or are removed from the code base), and almost all nonconfined classes stay nonconfined (or are removed). Figure 19 shows the differences in the numbers of confined types between versions. The upward arrows indicate the number of types that are new in a particular version of the code. The top of the upward arrows is anchored at the number of confined types for the specific version. The dashed arrows that go down diagonally from that point indicate the number of types that used to be confined and that have been removed from the codebase. The fact that in almost all places both arrows meet in exactly the same point shows that it is rare that confined types become nonconfined and vice-versa. The height of the bars at the bottom also illustrates this; the height of the bar is the number of types that are live, were live in the previous version and changed from confined to nonconfined or vice-versa. The graph shows that while the overall changes to the code are quite significant, the number of types that change their confinement property is marginal (with a total of six changes from version 3.0 to 5.0, with the total number of confined types in the different versions in between ranging from 46 to 104 with an average of 68). This stability of the confinement property over time supports the thesis that confinement would be a reasonable annotation for a type.
Runtime Performance
All benchmarks were performed on a Pentium III 800 with 256 MB of RAM running Linux 2.2.19 with IBM JDK 1.3. Except for the JDK tests (j1, j2, j3, j4) all running times include loading and analyzing required parts of the Sun JDK 1.3.1 libraries. The longest running time is that of JDK 1.3.1 which consists of 7,037 classes and is analyzed in 41 seconds. On average, Kacheck/J needs 7.5 milliseconds per class. Figure 20 summarizes the cost of confinement checking, detailed timings are in the appendix.
CONTAINERS AND LANGUAGE EXTENSIONS

Coding for Confinement
Our results clearly point to containers as one source of confinement violations. We considered using generic extensions of Java to increase confinement. Unfortunately, the homogeneous translation strategies adopted by Java implies that at the bytecode level, code written with generics is translated back to code that uses Object and casts. One might be able to uncover patterns of bytecode compiled from generics and use that to improve the analysis; however, Kacheck/J makes no attempt to do that and thus cannot verify that classes stored in generic containers remain confined. Heterogeneous translation strategies would have the drawback of causing code duplication. Fortunately, it is possible to achieve the desired result with some coding techniques. The basic idea is to use the adapter pattern to wrap an unconfined object around each confined object that must be stored in a container.
A confined implementation of a hashtable could provide an interface Entry with two methods equal(Entry e) and hashCode() (see Figure 21 ). In the package that contains the confined class C, the programmer would define an implementation RealEntry of Entry with a package-scoped constructor that takes the key and value (where, for example, the value has the type of the confined class) and package-scoped accessor methods. The Hashtable itself would only be able to access the public methods defined in Entry.
The cost of this change would be the creation of the extra Entry object that might not be required by other implementations of Hashtable. On the other hand, to access a key-value pair, this implementation only requires one cast (Entry to the RealEntry to access key and value), where the default implementation requires a cast on key and value. For other containers, the trade-offs may be worse. Zhao et al. [2006] suggested an alternative that involves extending confinement to generic types and annotating bytecode with confinement assertions. In addition to the existing rules presented so far, they require the rules given in Figure 22 . The rules C5 and C6 combined correspond to the subtyping partial and @Confined) , that, according to the given retention policy will be compiled into the .class files, but that will not be available for introspection at runtime. The inherited declaration ensures that the annotations are automatically applied to all subtypes.
order that prevents reference widening for Generic ConfinedFJ. C7 corresponds to the extra requirement in the definition of well-formed generic types. Unlike in the base system, C8 is necessary since we are not certain which method may be called before a generic class is instantiated.
Improved Language Support
Java can be extended to support confined types in several ways. Such extensions can be more or less intrusive on the syntax and semantics. We will consider two approaches:
1. explicit annotations for confined classes and anonymous methods, and 2. explicit annotations for confined classes but not for anonymous methods.
Using the meta-data facilities of Java 5 it is easy to add such annotations to Java code. Figure 23 shows how to specify the Confined and Anonymous annotations. In order to allow for running a static checker on the bytecode, the confinement property is preserved for the class files. The annotations are not needed at runtime. The rule that subclasses of confined types should also be confined is made explicit by the inherited annotation. Classes and Methods. In Vitek and Bokowski [2001] original proposal for confined types, both confined classes and anonymous methods had explicit modifiers, in the following style: @Confined class C extends B { @Anonymous int m() { return this.n(); } }
Explicit Annotations of
The constraints of Bokowski and Vitek are stricter than the constraints presented in this article. In particular, Bokowski and Vitek require that the anonymity of a method is preserved in all subclasses and that the static receiver of a virtual call must be anonymous. In contrast, the constraints checked by Kacheck/J only require the unique dynamic targets to be anonymous. Thus, the more modular checking will result in fewer confinement opportunities. The explicit annotation @Anonymous for anonymous methods simplifies checking the confinement constraint C1. That rule can be checked by (1) ensuring that every method invoked on a confined type is declared as @Anonymous and (2) by checking the constraints given by Bokowski and Vitek [2001] for anonymous methods. Having the programmer specifically specify methods as anonymous also makes it easier for the programmer to reason about confinement, just like confinement can be checked in a modular way the confinement violations are more localized since this approach avoids having to follow chains of anonymity violations across multiple methods.
Explicit Annotations of Classes, but not of Methods.
There are many more anonymous methods than confined classes. Thus, the burden on the programmer to annotate code can be lightened considerably by only requiring explicit annotation of classes. Moreover, the resulting inference of anonymous methods can be done according to the rules presented in this article. This inference is scalable and more precise than annotations for anonymous methods. Annotating existing code with a @Confined modifier can be done automatically with the results from Kacheck/J. The latest version of Kacheck/J for Java 5 allows both automatically annotating bytecode with @Confined metadata attributes (for use by other analyses that need confinement information) as well as checking that all types that are annotated to be @Confined in the source are actually confined (for verification of confinement assertions provided by the programmer).
REFACTORING FOR CONFINEMENT
In this section we detail how Kacheck/J can aid the process of first discovering that a class is not confined and then refactoring the program such that the class becomes confined.
The Example Program
We will use an example that stems from the Freenet application [Clarke et al. 2000 [Clarke et al. , 2002 . The example was found by inspecting the Freenet source code and discovering that class DoublyLinkedListImpl has an inner class which probably should be confined. For clarity, we will work with a much condensed version of class DoublyLinkedListImpl and two of its clients. We condensed the code mainly by removing methods and code sections irrelevant to our quest for making a class confined.
Our example program is shown in Figure 24 . The example program contains, in the left column, a rudimentary interface DoublyLinkedList and an implementation DoublyLinkedListImpl of doubly linked lists. The example program also contains, in the right column, two pieces of client code, called IntervalledSum and LoadStats, that use doubly linked lists. Notice that class DoublyLinkedListImpl has an inner class ItemImpl (which was called Item in the Freenet source code). Class ItemImpl is used to represent the state of objects of class DoublyLinkedListImpl. If we want to encapsulate the state of objects of class DoublyLinkedListImpl, then class ItemImpl should be confined. The Freenet code was written by many different authors. The multiple authorship may explain the two inconsistent uses of class DoublyLinkedListImpl: one client re-implements the Item interface from scratch, whereas another client extends the ItemImpl code. The Freenet code contains more than just these two uses of DoublyLinkedList; the two clients in Figure 24 are simple yet representative samples. 
Refactoring: Remove Simple Confinement Violations
In Figure 24 , the class ItemImpl is public, and therefore it is not confined by definition. However, confining ItemImpl is probably a good idea since its state is the internal representation of the DoublyLinkedList. Having clients outside of the package manipulate ItemImpl-objects might easily break invariants of the DoublyLinkedList implementation, such as the size of the list or the head and tail fields.
In order to confine ItemImpl, we must remove all violations of the confinement rules. Let us first consider rule C4 which requires that subtypes of a confined type must be confined. This clearly conflicts with the subclassing of ItemImpl by LoadEntry. This problem can be solved using the "Replace Inheritance with Delegation" refactoring pattern [Fowler et al. 1999] . Instead of extending Item a field value is added to the Item class. We use generics in order to give the field an appropriate type. Using this design also removes the code duplication in Report, which no longer needs to implement Item. Since ItemImpl is now going to be the only implementation of the Item interface, the split between implementation and interfaces is quite useless, so in order to simplify the code we remove the interfaces and eliminate the Impl from the names of the classes of the implementation. Finally, the access modifier of Item (formerly ItemImpl) is changed from public to default (in order to satisfy confinement rule C2). The result of the first refactoring is the program in Figure 25 .
Refactoring: Remove Widening Violations
If we run Kacheck/J on the program in Figure 25 , we will get the result that class Item is still not confined. The problem is that method nextElement widens Item to Object (upon return). We can refactor the program in Figure 25 to remove the violation.
The result of the second refactoring is the program in Figure 26 . As a result of the refactoring, Item is confined and clients can no longer easily break invariants of the DoublyLinkedList container.
Refactoring: Summary
In our experience, the biggest hurdle in refactoring code for confinement is to find candidates where such a refactoring would truely improve the code. The primary obstacle are Java's containers, which could theoretically be addressed by checking confinement at the source level. Nevertheless, in practice many classes can be easily confined by flattening the hierarchy and possibly wrapping references to instances in another class. However, while it is often easy to achieve confinement, refactoring code blindly simply to maximize confinement may result in unnatural datastructures with too many layers of abstraction.
RELATED WORK
Reference semantics permeate object-oriented programming languages, and the issue of controlling aliasing has been the focus of numerous papers in the recent years [Almeida 1997 [Almeida , 1999 Clarke et al. 1998; Detlefs et al. 1996 ; Genius et Hogg 1991; Hogg et al. 1992; Kent and Maung 1995; Noble et al. 1998 ]. We will discuss briefly the most relevant work. Bokowski and Vitek [1999] introduced the notion of confined types. In their paper, confined types are explicitly declared. Their paper discussed an implementation of a source-level confinement checker based on Bokowski's CoffeeStrainer [Bokowski 1999 ]. The main difference between that work and this article lies in the definition of anonymity. In both cases, anonymity rules are used to detect confinement breaches from hidden widening of confined types to public types that can occur with inherited methods (rule C1). However, the rules given by Bokowski and Vitek are much stronger than strictly necessary.
Consider the example of Figure 27 . Notice that class Parent is public so it cannot be confined. Intra-procedural analysis would not reveal that the expression new NotConf().violation() will widen NotConfined to Parent. So, Bokowski and Vitek chose to rely on explicit anonymity declarations and added an additional anonymity constraint: Thus, once a method is declared anonymous, all overriding definitions of that method have to abide by the constraints. When inferring anonymity, the rule A4 is not necessary. The goal of A4 was to ensure that anonymity of a method is independent from the result of method lookup. If anonymity of methods is inferred, dynamic binding can be taken into account. Figure 28 shows a confined class C that extends a class A. The method A.m() meets all anonymity criteria except for rule A4. The violation of that rule occurs in class B, because B extends A and redefines m() with an implementation that returns this. The key point to notice here is that the anonymity violation cannot occur if the dynamic type of this is A. We say the method A.m() is anonymous in relation to C, but not in relation to B.
Another difference between the old and the new anonymity rules is that we allow widening of the this reference to other confined types. The old rules forbid returning this or using this as an argument completely. The new rules allow such cases, if the type of the return value or the argument is again a confined type. An example is shown in Figure 29 , which is a minimal variation of Figure 27 (Parent is no longer public). In this case, the new rules would allow both classes to be confined. Noble et al. [1998] presented flexible alias protection as a means to control potential aliasing amongst components of an aggregate object (or owner). Aliasing-mode declarations specify constraints on the sharing of references. The mode rep protects representation objects from exposure. In essence, rep objects belong to a single owner object and the model guarantees that all paths that lead to a representation object go through that object's owner. The mode arg marks argument objects that do not belong to the current owner, and therefore may be aliased from the outside. Argument objects can have different roles, and the model guarantees that an owner cannot introduce aliasing between roles. Hogg's Islands [Hogg 1991 ] and Almeida's Balloons [Almeida 1997 [Almeida , 1999 similar aims. An Island or Balloon is an owner object that protects its internal representation from aliasing. The main difference from Noble et al. [1998] is that both proposals strive for full encapsulation, that is, all objects reachable from an owner are protected from aliasing. This is equivalent to declaring everything inside an Island or Balloon as rep. This is restrictive, since it prevents many common programming styles; it is not possible to mix protected and unprotected objects as done with flexible alias protection and confined types. Hogg's proposal extends Smalltalk-80 with sharing annotations but it has neither been implemented nor formally validated. Almeida did present an abstract interpretation algorithm to decide if a class meets his balloon invariants, but it was also not implemented so far. Balloon types are similar to confined types in that they only require an analysis of the code of the balloon type and not of the whole program. Boyland et al. [2001] introduced capabilities as a uniform system to describe restrictions imposed on references. Their system can model many of the different modifiers used to address the aliasing problem, such as immutable, unique, readonly or borrowed. They also model a notion of anonymous references, which is different from the one used in this article. Their system of access rights cannot be used to model confined types, mainly because it lacks support for modeling package-scoped access. Kent and Maung [1995] proposed an informal extension of the Eiffel programming language with ownership annotations that are tracked and monitored at run-time. Barnett et al. [2004] used a simple notion of ownership as the basis for an approach to specifying and checking properties stated as pre-and post-conditions for methods and object invariants; in their system, the checking of ownership is itself a proof obligation. Also Müller [2001] used ownership in support of verification but in this case checked by a type system. In the field of static program analysis, a number of techniques have been developed. Static escape analyses such as the ones proposed by Blanchet [1999 Blanchet [ , 2003 and others [Bogda and Hölzle 1999; Deutsch 1995] provide much more precise results than our technique, but come at a higher analysis cost. They often require whole program analyses, and are sensitive to small changes in the source code.
Clarke [2001] and Clarke et al. [1998] formalized representation containment by means of ownership types. Their seminal paper has sparked much interest, and many papers have explored ownership types since then. Ownership types enforce that all paths from the root of an object system must pass through an object's owner. The paper of Clarke et al. [1998] allowed just three annotations, rep, norep, and owner for specifying ownership, while later papers have introduced additional or alternative annotations [Aldrich et al. 2002; Clarke and Wrigstad 2003; Rustan et al. 2004; Müller and Poetzsch-Heffter 1999] . Ownership types are inherently more flexible than confined types, while experiments with inferring ownership types, for example using the approach of Aldrich et al. [2002] , indicate that confined types lead to more scalable inference. Ownership types have been used as the basis for specifying a variety of properties via types, such as the absence of data races and deadlocks [Boyapati et al. 2002 [Boyapati et al. , 2003 .
Most of the approaches mentioned above use operational semantics to reason about alias protection and ownership. Banerjee and Naumann [2002] used denotational semantics to prove a representation-independence theorem, that is, a result about whether a class can safely be replaced by another class, independently of the program in which the class occurs. They use a syntactic notion of confinement, like we do, in which the protection domain is an instance rather than a package. Their notion of confinement is more restrictive than ours and it leads to a powerful theorem about classes.
CONCLUSION
We have presented the Kacheck/J tool for inferring confinement in Java programs and used the tool to analyze over 46,000 classes. The number of confined types found by the analysis are surprisingly high, about 24% of all packagescoped classes and interfaces are confined. Furthermore, we discovered that many of the confinement violations are caused by the use of container classes and thus might be solved by extending Java with genericity, this would increase confinement to 30%. The biggest surprise was the number of violations due to badly chosen access modifiers. After inferring tighter access modifiers, 45% of all package-scoped classes were confined. We expect that these numbers will rise even further once programmers start to write code with confinement in mind.
Confinement is an important property. It bounds aliasing of encapsulated objects to the defining package of their class, and helps in re-engineering object-oriented software by exposing potential software defects, or at least making, often subtle, dependencies visible. We have demonstrated that inferring confined types is fast and scalable. Kacheck/J is available from http://ovmj.org/kacheck/.
APPENDIXES
A. CONSTRAINT GENERATION
In this section, we present the opcodes generate that constraints for confined types.
InvokeStatic
-If this occurs in the argument list, record widening of this to the type T of the matching argument in the current method m. This generates the constraint: C ⇒ A where C is not-conf(T ) and A is not-anon(m). -For each argument a of inferred type T that is an object, record the corresponding declared type T of the parameter. This generates constraints C ⇒ C where C is not-conf(T ) and C is not-conf(T ).
Areturn, Putfield, Putstatic, Aastore
-If the variable that is returned or stored is this, record widening of this to the declared type T (the return type, type of the field or the component type of the array). This generates a constraint C ⇒ A where C is not-conf(T ) and A is not-anon(m) with m being the current method. -If the variable that is used is an object but not this and has inferred type T , record widening to the corresponding declared type T . This generates constraints C ⇒ C where C is not-conf(T ) and C is not-conf(T ).
• C. Grothoff et al. Fig. 30 . Statistics for the benchmarks. C is Confined, GC is Generic-Confined, CA is Confinable and GCA is Genrice-Confinable.
InvokeInterface, InvokeVirtual, InvokeSpecial
-If this occurs in the argument list, record widening of this to the type T of the matching argument in the current method m. This generates the constraint: C ⇒ A where C is not-conf(T ) and A is not-anon(m). -If the call is of the form this.n(), calling a method n from method m on this, record method invocation distinguishing between invokevirtual, invokeinterface and invokespecial. This generates the constraint A ⇒ A where A is not-anon(n) and A is not-anon(m).
• 32:37 -If the call is not on this but of the form a.n(), record an invocation on type T where T is the inferred type of a. This generates the constraint A ⇒ C where A is not-anon(n) and C is not-conf(T ). -For each argument a of inferred type T that is an object, record the corresponding declared type T of the parameter. This generates constraints C ⇒ C where C is not-conf(T ) and C is not-conf(T ).
Athrow
-If the variable that is thrown is this, record widening of this to Throwable. This generates a constraint C ⇒ A, where C is not-conf(Throwable) and A is not-anon(m) with m being the current method. Because the condition not-conf(Throwable) is always true, a primitive constraint A can be used, too. -If the thrown variable is an object but not this and has inferred type T , record widening to Throwable. This generates a constraint C ⇒ C where C is again always true (not-conf(Throwable)) and C is not-conf(T ).
Call Propagation
A call to method m on a type T must generate additional constraints for all subtypes S i of T that are widened to T . 
